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Beacon Theatres and the
Constitutional Right to Jury Trial
Taking the Supreme Court’s 1959 decision in Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover as his point of reference, the author discusses the
complexities of determining which actions or issues are legal and
which are equitable, on which hangs the right to trial by jury. He
suggests a new and modern approach to these questions.

by Paul Frederick Rothstein • Assistant Professor of Law at the University
of Texas

The

latest relatively com-

plete expression by the United States
Supreme Court on the constitutional
right to jury trial in civil cases is the
opinion in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover.1 While the result and some
of the reasoning in that case are doubt
ful, the opinion suggests a fundamen
tally sound approach to the problem.2
The Seventh Amendment of the
Constitution is interpreted universally
to mean that if an issue would have
been tried to a jury in a court of law
(as opposed to some court where trial
was not to a jury, as in equity) at the
time of the adoption of the amend
ment, 1791, then upon proper demand3
it must be so tried today.
In Beacon Fox West Coast Theatres,
Inc., brought an action against Beacon
to prevent it from threatening Fox
with antitrust suits and to determine
whether Fox actually was violating the
antitrust laws, as Beacon seemed to
believe.4 Beacon counterclaimed by
asserting the antitrust violation against
Fox, asking damages therefor. The
issue of antitrust violation vel non was
thus a common factual issue determi
native of both the claim and counter
claim. The trier of fact (judge or
jury) that got the issue first would
determine it once and for all, and that

determination would be binding for
purposes of both the claim and coun
terclaim.5
Fox asserted that its claim was equi
table and that the judge should try the
issue.6 Beacon asserted that its counter
claim was legal and that the Seventh
Amendment commanded that the jury
try the issue.7 The district court ruled

that the judge should try the issue, and
the court of appeals upheld that ruling
as a matter within the trial judge’s dis
cretion.8 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the jury must try the issue
under the Seventh Amendment.9
The Supreme Court’s decision seems
to have been reached on two alterna
tive grounds: (1) The Declaratory

1. 359 U. S. 500 (1959). See also. Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469 (1962), and Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Company, 374
U. S. 16 (1963).
2. Compare James, Right to a Jury Trial in
Civil Actions, 72 Yale L. J. 655, 686 (1963).
Professor James’s excellent piece appears as a
chapter in his treatise on civil procedure,
published by Little, Brown & Company.
3. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38, 39.
4. The complaint invoked equitable injunc
tive power and the federal Declaratory Judg
ment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202. The antitrust
controversey asked to be resolved involved
Fox’s alleged contracts with others granting
Fox exclusive first-run rights on certain films
for its theaters, under Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
5. Under accepted principles of res judicata.
See the court of appeals’ opinion in Beacon,
252 F. 2d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 1958).
6. It is well accepted that a case involving
only an equitable claim and an answer thereto
is not within the constitutional guarantee.
Wright, Federal Courts 353 (1963). See also
Berlin v. Club 100, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 129 (D. Mass.
1951). If there is no statute, rule or decision
granting a right to jury trial in such a case, it
will be tried to a judge.
7. It is well accepted that a case Involving
only a legal claim and an answer thereto is
within the constitutional guarantee. See
Wright, Federal Courts 353 (1963). See also
Berlin v. Club 100, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 129 (D. Mass.
1951). There is no difficulty when two claims
(or a claim and a counterclaim or two counter
claims), one legal, the other equitable, are
joined and there is no issue of fact common

between them. Each is accorded its respective
mode of trial, and the order is seldom impor
tant. Similarly, if both are equitable or legal,
there is no problem. It is now settled that one
who joins an equitable cause to a legal one
does not waive his right to a jury trial, even
when there is a common factual issue. See
Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F. 2d 730 (9th Cir.
1946); Union Central Life Insurance Com
pany v. Burger, 27 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. N.Y.
1939) (legal claim, equitable counterclaim;
counterclaimant does not waive).
8. 252 F. 2d 864 ( 9th Cir. 1958). The case
came up on a request for mandamus. The trial
judge’s discretion was upheld as within Fed.
R. Civ. P. 42(b), 57.
9. The decision purports to be constitutional,
but the reader should be aware that it may,
at some later date, conceivably be construed
as promulgated vv-the Court’s capacity as regu
lator of federal procedure, or as an adjunct
of the federal substantive right involved. The
resort to history found in the decision is not
completely inconsistent with such an interpre
tation. The Court is relatively free to prescribe
the mode of trial in cases which are not neces
sarily jury triable under the Constitution and
for which the legislature has not provided a
mode of trial. In what capacity the Court was
acting is important, of course, in determining
whether Congress can change the Beacon rule,
in determining the ease and probability of
judicial change and in predicting further judi
cial developments. One would expect some
discussion of the relative appropriateness of
the two modes of trial and their merits if this
were other than a constitutional decision.
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Judgment Act rendered the complaint
legal rather than equitable, with the
result that neither the claim nor the
counterclaim was equitable. (2) Even
if the complaint was equitable, the
filing of the legal counterclaim provided a legal controversy fully adequate
for the resolution of the common issue,
and equity will only act insofar as the
law is inadequate.10
It is submitted in this article that the
complaint should have been character
ized as equitable, as should have been
the counterclaim;11 but that the Court
suggested a significant new approach
for which, unfortunately, Beacon was
not the appropriate case.

Declaratory Judgment Act
Was Misused
Before 1791, when there was no
Declaratory Judgment Act and courts
of law and equity were separate, only
equity could have entertained Fox’s
claim. When a plaintiff could show that
special hardship would result if he
'A waited for an expected lawsuit'to be
brought against him, equity would
take jurisdiction to determine £he
grounds of the lawsuit even though no
equitable issues were involved; and it
might temporarily or permanently
enjoin the lawsuit.12 The determination
in equity would be res judicata barring
the lawsuit or furnishing the basis for
a subsequent legal award (if equity did
not retain ancillary jurisdiction and
award the legal relief also). No such
action was available at law.
For purposes of the decision, both
the majority and the dissent in Beacon
apparently treated Fox’s complaint as
pleading sufficient hardship to come
within this doctrine. Fox’s business
was suffering from the continued
threats of antitrust action and Beacon’s
delay in filing an antitrust suit. But the
important point is that, if any court
took the claim, it would have been
equity, and the Court seems to have
recognized this.
However, there is no merit to the
majority’s further notion that the
relatively recent Declaratory Judgment
Act now provides Fox with a remedy
at law that would have caused equity to
close its doors to him. When the func
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tion of the Declaratory Judgment Act have been properly characterized le
most closely approximates a function gal.14
formerly performed only by equity, it
On the same sort of reasoning, the
does not make sense to characterize the counterclaim must be characterized as
act’s remedy as legal or (what is the equitable. The counterclaim was com
same thing) to assume that it would pulsory.15 This means that Fox, the
have been administered by law courts plaintiff, was able to force Beacon to
if it had been passed before 1791. This litigate Beacon’s claim of antitrust
would defeat the intent of the framers violation at a time and place selected
of the act, who hoped to confine its by Fox. In pre-1791 practice, the only
effects on substantive matters as closely way Fox might have done this was by
as possible.13
bringing its claim in equity, as de
The position of the majority raises scribed above. That could have had the
the question of what the majority effect of forcing Beacon to litigate the
would have done if the Declaratory essence of its case, the issue of viola
Judgment Act were not pleaded in the tion vel non, at the instance of Fox.
complaint. In ancient equity practice Thus, Beacon’s counterclaim seems to
the mere availability of an adequate have had the essential characteristics
legal remedy pre-empted equity of of an answer in equity.16
jurisdiction. Does the existence of the
Consequently, both the claim and
Declaratory Judgment Act mean that counterclaim should have been consid
the Declaratory Judgment Act provides ered equitable. If this had been done,
the exclusive remedy for Fox and that the case would have fallen outside the
the old equitable action is no longer constitutional guarantee.
available? If not, Fox erred by men
tioning the act in its complaint. If the
Declaratory Judgment AcHs the exclu Validity of Approach
sive remedy, what if it is' Wot pleaded of the Court
in the complaint? Will the court auto
Certain other language in the opin
matically regard the complaint as one ion suggests an approach that is ap
under the Declaratory Judgment 'Act? propriate for a case like Beacon, but
* where the claim is recognized as equi
Or will the case be dismissed?
The dissenting opinion in Beacon table, and the counterclaim is actually
presents a somewhat more cogent legal, as in a jurisdiction where the
characterization of the Declaratory counterclaim would not be compulso
Judgment Act, but still maintains that ry.17 Since Beacon was treated as such
if this had been merely a “juxtaposi a case throughout a large portion of
tion of parties” case, the act would the majority opinion, it is not surpris10. It should be noticed that for purposes of
jury trial, the distinction between legal and
equitable jurisdiction perseveres. Post-1791
cases are often cited in this field to reflect
what pre-1791 courts might have done, since in
doctrine, if not in mechanics, separate law and
equity jurisprudences still continue to evolve.
11. On its face, the counterclaim appears
legal, involving as it does a claim for money
damages for breach of statutory duty.
12. See American Life Insurance Company v.
Stewart, 300 U. S. 203 (1937); Enelow v. New
York Life Insurance Company, 293 U. S. 379
(1935); Prudential Insurance Company v. Saxe,
134 F. 2d 16 (D.C. Clr.), cert, denied, 319 U. S.
745 (1943); Cable v. United States Life Insur
ance Company, 191 U. S. 289 (1903); Phoenix
Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Bailey, 13
Wall. 616 (1871); Town of Fairfield v. South
port National Bank, 77 Conn. 423, 59 A. 513
(1904); 1 Pomeboy, Equity Jurisprudence § IV
(Sth ed. 1941). We shall discuss later what
equity would do with the case If, subsequent
to the filing of the bill In equity, the lawsuit
was begun.
13. See Bobchard, Declaratory Judgments
1039 ( 2d ed. 1941). Many states also have
declaratory judgment acts. See 9 U.L.A. Cum.
Ann. Pocket Pa«t 9 (1962); Conn. Gen. Stat.
5 52-29 (1958); N.Y. Civ. Pbac. Act 5 473 (1943);
N.Y. Civ. Pbac. L.R. $ 3001 (1962).
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14. 359 U. S. at 515.
15. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
16. It cannot be gainsaid, of course, that at
least superficially and out of context, Beacon’s
claim for money damages for breach of statu
tory duty seems eminently legal.
17. See, e.g., Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1019 (Burna’
1946); Neb. Rev*. Stat. § 25-814 (1948); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2323-40 (Baldwin 1953);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 275 (1951); Wyo.
Comp. Stat. Ann. § 3-1314 (1945). In some of
such states, as New York, counterclaims may in
effect be compelled in certain instances by res
judicata and other considerations. See Advis
ory Committee on Practice and Procedure of
the N.Y. State Temporary Commission on the
Courts, First Preliminary Report (Leg. Doc.
6(b), at 69-70 (1957).
Most states have guarantees quite similar in
application, to the Seventh Amendment. See,
e.g., Cal. Const., art. I, | 7 (People v. One
Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P. 2d 832
(1951); Conn. Const., art. I, f 21; N.Y. Const.,
art. I, § 2 (see also N.Y. Civ. Pbact. Act § 425);
Pa. Const., Art. I, $ 6, Fairly atypical provi
sions are N.C. Const., art. IV, $ 1, and Texas
Const., art. I, 5 15, art. V, §§ 8, 10; Tenn. Code
Ann., § 21-1011 (1955); Ga. Code SS 10-402,
37-1103 (1933); Colo. Const, art. 2 5 23 (Miller
v. O'Brien, 75 Colo. 117, 233 Pac. 1088 (1924), no
guarantee); La. Const, art. 1, 5 9 (no
guarantee).

Right to Jury Trial
ing that such an approach was engen
dered.
The court of appeals believed that if
the facts of Beacon had been presented
to the courts before 1791, the trial
judge would have had discretion as to
whether to cause the common issue to
be determined by a jury or by himself,
and therefore the district court should
have been affirmed.18 The authority for
what the ancient courts would have
done with Beacon is the group of cases
in which one wishing to determine in
advance an expected or threatened
lawsuit came into equity on grounds
that would be assertable as defenses in
the lawsuit as described above, and
subsequently, after equity took juris
diction and while the equitable cause
was still pending, the feared lawsuit
was initiated. At that point, it is clear
that sometimes equity enjoined the law
suit pending the outcome in equity;
sometimes retained the case on its
docket pending the outcome at law;
and sometimes relinquished jurisdic
tion altogether.19

tional reasons for equitable jurisdic
tion, many equity courts would not
have exercised (or permitted the exer
cise of) discretion to retain jurisdic
tion.21 Part of the relevant facts of
Beacon are that there was no danger
whatever that Beacon, once having
asserted its legal claim, might drop it,
possibly to reassert it later, perhaps at
a different place, with the ensuing
delay and prejudice to Fox.22 The “le
gal” and “equitable” claims were
brought simultaneously; there was no
danger of multiple litigation and thehardship on courts and parties that en
tails; there was no risk of lapse or in
convenience in removing to another
courthouse and another judicial ad
ministration, with different pleadings
and papers, and starting anew;23 there
was no question of affronting the dig
nity of one judge or court system in
favor of another upon ouster of juris
diction.24
Unfortunately, this line of reasoning
is only suggested by certain language
in the Beacon decision, and is there so
intertwined with the error concerning
the characterization of the Declaratory
Judgment Act that its import is lost.25

Paul Frederick Rothstein was
graduated
from Northwestern
University School of Law in 1961
and was admitted to the Illinois
Bar that year. Under a Fulbright
scholarship he studied British
and American antitrust law at
Oxford until 1963. Before join
ing the Texas faculty, he taught
law at the University of Michi
gan.

While it is somewhat difficult to
determine on what grounds one course
was chosen over the others and what
facts might have rendered one choice
or another an abuse of discretion,20 it
is certainly reasonable to assume that
if a case had been presented in which
there appeared to be none of the tradi

Taking Modern
Circumstances into View
The approach just outlined may
seem to take too much account of
modern circumstances, and may seem

to point the way to unlimited incorpo
ration of modern lav^ and procedure
into the “facts” of the case, with conse
quent unlimited contraction of equity
jurisdiction and non jury trial. Any
historical approach to the problem
must take some account of modern

18. Fid. R. Civ. P. 42 was considered to pro
vide the modem trial judge with a similar
discretion concerning the order of trial under
the merged procedure. This rule has been in
voked a number of times to permit the trial
judge discretion in solving difficult questions of
trial sequence in mixed legal-equitable cases.
See Orenstein v. United States, 191 F. 2d 184
(1st Cir. 1951); Tanimura v. United States, 195
F. 2d 329 ( 9th Cir. 1952). But compare Leimer
v. Woods, 192 F. 2d 828 ( 8th Cir. 1952). The
position of the Court of Appeals in Beacon
is taken by James, op. cit. supra note 2, at
683. 687.
19. New York Life Insurance Company v.
Seymour, 45 F. 2d 47 (6th Cir. 1930); American
Life Insurance Co. v. Stewart, 300 U. S. 203
(1937); Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Conway, 11 N. Y. 2d 367, 183 N. E. 2d 754
(1962); James, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 683;
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F. 2d
864, 876 (9th Cir. 1958). Cf. Prudential Insur
ance Company v. Saxe, 134 F. 2d 16 (D.C. Cir.),
cert, denied 319 U. S. 745 (1943).
20. “There would be many circumstances to
be weighed, as, for instance, the condition of
the court calendar, whether the [equity plain
tiff) had been precipitate or its adversaries
dilatory, as well as other factors. In the end,
benefit and hardship would have to be set off,
the one against the other, and a balance ascer
tained.” American Life Insurance Company
V. Stewart, 300 U. S. 203, 216 (1937).
21. It is sufficient that many equity trial
judges would have so acted, whether or not
there was a rule of equity or a precept en-

forceable upon review. The Supreme Court
would be perfectly justified in reading the
practice of trial judges for purposes of the
Seventh Amendment.
22. The danger of tactical manipulation of
timing and location by the prospective law
plaintiff has been cited as the inadequacy of
law that justifies this sort of bill in equity. The
freedom of the law plaintiff under older pro
cedure to drop his case without prejudice, to
the disadvantage of the law defendant, has
been mentioned as a ground for continuation
of equitable jurisdiction in cases of this type,
even after the lawsuit has been filed. Phoenix
Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Bailey, 13
Wall. 616 (1871); Cable v. United States Life
Insurance Company, 191 U. S. 289 (1903); New
York Life Insurance Company v. Seymour, 45
F. 2d 47 (6th Cir. 1930); American Life Insur
ance Company v. Stewart, 300 U. S. 203 (1937);
Enelow v. New York Life Insurance Co., 293
U. S. 379; Prudential Insurance Company v.
Saxe, 134 F. 2d 16 (D.C. Cir.), cert, dented
319 U. S. 745 (1943); Phoenix Mutual Life In
surance Company v. Conway, 11 N. Y. 2d 367,
183 N. E. 2d 754 (1962). The fact that the
counterclaim in Beacon is compulsory removes
this danger. It is assumed at this point that
the compulsory nature of the counterclaim
does not render the counterclaim equitable in
the fashion discussed earlier.
23. These sorts of dangers have been cited as
legal inadequacies justifying a bill in equity
of this kind. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
Company v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616 (1871); Cable
v. United States Life Insurance Company, 191
U. S. 289 (1903); Town of Fairfield v. Southport

National Bank, Tl Conn. 423, 59 A. 513 (1904);
1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § IV, par
ticularly §§ 261 h et seq., 264 a, b, 269 (5th ed.
1941). See also American Life Insurance Com
pany v. Stewart, 300 U. S. 203 (1937). Merged
procedure, of course, obviates these dangers.
24. Dignity and competition or jealousy of
power were, of course, often behind equity’s
retention of jurisdiction once obtained, even
though law subsequently became adequate.
25. Especially at 359 U. S. 500, 509-510: “Since
in the federal courts equity has always acted
only when legal remedies were inadequate, the
expansion of adequate legal remedies pro
vided by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the
Federal Rules necessarily affects the scope of
equity. Thus, the justification for equity’s de
ciding legal issues once it obtains jurisdiction,
and refusing to dismiss a case, merely because
subsequently a legal remedy becomes available,
must be re-evaluated in the light of the liberal
joinder provisions of the Federal Rules which
allow legal and equitable causes to be brought
and resolved in one civil action. Similarly the
need for, and therefore, the availability of such
equitable remedies as bills of peace, quia timet
and injunction must be reconsidered in view
of the existence of the Declaratory Judgment
Act as well as the liberal joinder provision of
the Rules. This is not only in accord with the
spirit of the Rules and the Act but is required
by the provision in the Rules that ”[t)he right
to trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by
a statute of the United States shall be preserved
. . . inviolate.”
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circumstances, since they are part of
the facts or circumstances surrounding
the case, and before one can ask what
an ancient court would have done with
this case or a case like this case, one
must decide just what facts constitute
this case or type of case, and just how
much of the surrounding circum
stances to include in this imaginary
reference to the ancient court. Why
draw the line in Beacon at supposing
the antitrust laws, the commercial
situation there involved, and those
parties, into history?

| The degree to which one is willing
to take account of modern circum
stances depends, of course, to some
extent upon one’s views regarding the
relative appropriateness and desirabili
ty of the two modes of trial; but the
necessity for a logically satisfying and
consistent historical argument under
the Seventh Amendment places some
constraint on the range of possible
decisions. There is no logical reason
for incorporating fewer of the modern
circumstances than those suggested
here,26 and the Supreme Court, with its
favoritism for the jury mode of trial,27
is not likely to manufacture one. But
the approach is not satisfying or con
sistent if there is no logical limit to the
process of incorporating modem cir
cumstances, down to the point where
equity jurisdiction and non jury trial
completely disappear. Such might be
the case if, for example, the historical
test was: What would equity have done
in an environment where all courts had
power to grant both legal and equita
ble relief? In such an environment,
law might be entirely adequate with no
need for equity. Does the approach
propounded here lead to this?
As originally articulated by the
Supreme Court in Beacon, the contrac
tion of equity jurisdiction might well
be almost unlimited. The suggestion
that the Declaratory Judgment Act is
always a legal remedy indicates that
whenever formerly equitable actions
are facilitated by a statutory proce
dure, there is no longer any need for
equitable jurisdiction, which conse
quently must evaporate. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and many
state rules have statutory force28 and
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would seem to facilitate formerly equi
table actions in much the same way as
the Declaratory Judgment Act. In
addition, modem statutes and rules of
procedure provide forums which have
power to grant all forms of relief
formerly administered separately by
law and equity. Under the extreme
approach, these forums would be legal
forums.
While it would probably be constitu
tional to eliminate noh jury trial alto
gether in this fashion, the decisions,
at this point at any rate, certainly pur
port to be delimiting jury and non jury
areas. The opinion in Beacon itself at
tempts to limit the contraction of equity
under the Beacon rationale to the elim
ination of such things as bills of peace
and quia timet, which somewhat resem
ble in function the use Fox made of the
Declaratory Judgment Act (the antici
patory determination of legal contro
versy ) J9
But aside from the Court’s erro
neous treatment of the Declaratory
Judgment Act, and extensions thereof,
the approach has some natural bound
aries. The essence of the approach
seems to be that where equity jurisdic
tion was justified only because the
courthouses of law and equity were
separated, rather than because of some
deficiency in legal doctrine or cogni
zance, there is no longer a need for
equitable jurisdiction. The formulation
is necessarily somewhat nebulous.
This approach would eliminate
equitable jurisdiction where the pri
mary reason for it was the expense,
inconvenience or delay to a party inci
dent to shuttling him physically be
tween courthouses or where equitable
jurisdiction seems to have been pri
marily based upon a more or less
selfish reluctance to yield to a compet
ing judicial administration. A few
examples of such jurisdiction will
suffice: Equity retained jurisdiction to
settle damage claims for breach of
contract after reforming the contract.30
Again, where a plaintiff properly
sought to cumulate both injunction
and damages for a continuing breach
of statutory duty, equity did not re
quire him to go to law first to deter
mine the breach and then come to
equity for an injunction if there was a
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breach, nor did equity remit him to
law to get damages after issuing an
injunction, but retained ancillary jur
isdiction to award the damages, too.31
Under the new approach, however,
equitable jurisdiction would remain to
grant relief of a kind formerly availa
ble only in equity, as, for example,
specific performance, injunction, can
cellation or reformation, if these had
not worked over into legal cognizance
before 1791 or if it cannot reasonably
be said that they would have been
worked into law before 1791 had the
proper case arisen. Hence, when the
only claim involved in a suit is for one
of these, trial would be to a judge.
Difficulty arises when a plaintiff
today in a single action has a right to
alternative reliefs, one legal and one
equitable, as a claim for specific per
formance or damages. He may not
even have to claim them both. The
court may have the right to award
whichever is appropriate.32
The approach propounded here may
go so far as to require a legal determi
nation of the substantive rights in
volved. For equity might have required
the plaintiff to go first to a law court to
determine whether there was indeed a
wrong and then return to equity for ad
ditional or alternative relief if he
wanted to and was entitled to it, had
there been no inconvenience and multi
plicity of litigation involved in such a
course.
Perhaps somewhat unwittingly the
Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres has
suggested an approach to the right, to
jury trial in civil cases under the Sev
enth Amendment, which approach
places primary emphasis on a bifurca
tion of doctrine rather than of forums.
This seems to be in accord with the
purposes of the architects of merger
and the Seventh Amendment.
26. See notes 22-24. supra, and accompanying
text.
27. Consider together with Beacon, Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469 (1962);
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Company, 374
U. S. 16 (1963) ; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec
tric Co-operative, 356 U. S. 525 (1958); Dice v.
Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co., 342
U. S. 359 (1952).
28. See 28 U.S.C. 5 2072.
29. See note 25, supra.
30. E.g., Keith v. Henkleman, 173 Ill. 137, 50
N.E. 692 (1898).
31. See Diary Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S.
469 (1962).
32. See F«d. R. Civ. P. 54(a).

